The banking firm: the role of signaling with collaterals

In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. --Signaling,collateral,perfect Bayesian equilibrium

A Strategic Approach to Financial Options

To explain the strategic dimension in pricing options, it will be helpful to go back to the heart of the idea behind the concept of an option: options open up the possibility to postpone current decisions to a future point of time. Because of this flexibility additional information and new experiences can be taken into consideration. There are advantages and benefits resulting from this flexibility. The value of the option with the probabilities of the states of nature occurring. These probabilities will turn out the strategic decision variables of a new player as explained in the paper. --Financial Option,Real Option,Option Premium Game

The New Basel Accord and the Nature of Risk: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Basel II changes risk management in banks strongly. Internal rating procedures would lead one to expect that banks are changing over to active risk control. But, if risk management is no longer a simple "game against nature", if all agents involved are active players then a shift from a non-strategic model setting (measuring event risk stochastically) to a more general strategic model setting (measuring behavioral risk adequately) comes true. Knowing that a game is any situation in which the players make strategic decisions – i.e., decisions that take into account each other's actions and responses – game theory is a useful set of tools for better understanding different risk settings. Embedded in a short history of the Basel Accord in this article we introduce some basic ideas of game theory in the context of rating procedures in accordance with Basel II. As well, some insight is given how game theory works. Here, the primary value of game theory stems from its focus on behavioral risk: risk when all agents are presumed rational, each attempting to anticipate likely actions and reactions by its rivals --New Basel Accord,event risk,behavioral risk,rating,simple game,Nash-equilibrium,game theory

Market Risk: Exponential Weightinh in the Value-at-Risk Calculation

When measuring market risk, credit institutions and Alternative Investment Fund Managers may deviate from equally weighting historical data in their Value-at-Risk calculation and instead use an exponential time series weighting. The use of expo-nential weighting in the Value-at-Risk calculation is very popular because it takes into account changes in market volatility (immediately) and can therefore quickly adapt to VaR. In less volatile market phases, this leads to a reduction in VaR and thus to lower own funds requirements for credit institutions. However, in the ex-ponential weighting a high volatility in the past is quickly forgotten and the VaR can be underestimated when using exponential weighting and the VaR may be un-derestimated. To prevent this, credit institutions or Alternative Investment Fund Managers are not completely free to choose a weighting (decay) factor. This article describes the legal requirements and deals with the calculation of the permissible weighting factor. As an example we use the exchange rate between Euro and Polish zloty to estimate the Value-at-Risk. We show the calculation of the weighting factor with two different approaches. This article also discusses exceptions to the general legal requirements

General equilibrium with a continuum of oligopolies

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Dynamic externalities and instability in an economy ecology system: the case of oligopolistic exploitation of a renewable resource stock

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Scenario Management für die Hochschule - Wie sich ein Fachbereich erfolgreich auf die Zukunft vorbereitet

Hochschulen und Fachbereiche müssen sich heute stärker denn je die Frage stellen, ob sie erfolgreich am „Markt“ positioniert sind. Am Beispiel eines Fachbereichs wird dargestellt, wie solche komplexen Fragestellungen mittels des „SzenarioManagement“ bearbeitet werden können

Strategic option pricing

In this paper an extension of the well-known binomial approach to option pricing is presented. The classical question is: What is the price of an option on the risky asset? The traditional answer is obtained with the help of a replicating portfolio by ruling out arbitrage. Instead a two-person game from the Nash equilibrium of which the option price can be derived is formulated. Consequently both the underlying asset’s price at expiration and the price of the option on this asset are endogenously determined. The option price derived this way turns out, however, to be identical to the classical no-arbitrage option price of the binomial model if the expiration-date prices of the underlying asset and the corresponding risk-neutral probability are properly adjusted according to the Nash equilibrium data of the game